On March 19th French aircrafts attacked Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya in an effort to protect the rebel stronghold in Benghazi. Many believed that a limited deployment of Western air power would be sufficient to give the battered opposition much needed momentum in the conflict between Gaddafi and the Libyan rebels. The Western refusal to deploy ground forces might however prolong the war since the rebels have seemed remarkably unable to defeat the regular military units of the Libyan government in open combat.
Olle Schmidt, a Swedish member of the European Parliament, declared during a seminar in Gothenburg on March 19th that the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi probably would lose power as a result of his country’s turmoil and the support of the Western powers to the Libyan opposition. His downfall was only “a matter of days”, according to Schmidt. There were however reasons to believe otherwise.
In an effort to neutralize Gaddafi’s military advantage in the struggle between loyalist and rebel forces, Western powers attacked Libyan aircrafts and prevented them from taking off from their airbases. The political opposition therefore gained a much needed aerial umbrella that will safeguard the rebel stronghold of Benghazi from aerial assaults. Aerial support was however the only help the opposition would receive from at least the United States. During his official visit in Brazil, President Obama declared that he had no intentions of committing American ground forces to Libya. Thus, he more or less summed up the position of the Western powers in regard to the Libyan conflict. With commitments in both Iraq and the more urgent Afghanistan, it is not hard to think why Western governments were reluctant to deploy forces to the actual fighting in places such as Benghazi and Misrata. They rather hoped for that the Libyan opposition would successfully deal with Gaddafi’s forces since his air force was prevented from entering Libyan airspace.
Such hopes might turn for the worst. It is obvious that the Libyan conflict is not only a matter of an autocracy fighting self-proclaimed proponents for democracy but also a struggle between tribes with different positions in the tribal hierarchy. Qaddadfa, the tribe of Gaddafi, had an imperative role in the ousting of Libyan King Idris in 1969. Members of this tribe have ever since then been appointed in key positions in the Libyan society by Gaddafi, thus securing their support. It is therefore no surprise that the most adamant loyalists are to be found among Qaddadfa ranks. If the rebels ever regain momentum they will not only have to contend with Gaddafi’s mercenaries. Resistance from Qaddadfa civilians will also increase as they advance deeper into their tribal territory on the road to Tripoli. On the other hand, Gaddafi will likely face similar increasing resistance if his forces should be able to advance into territories populated by hostile tribes such as Zywayya. There is also a potent possibility that Libya might turn into a new Iraq plagued by sectarian violence if one of the two sides would wipe out the military forces of the opponent. Iraq was for many years after the downfall of Saddam Hussein a constant warzone in the struggle between earlier oppressed Curds and Muslim Shi’as and earlier favoured Muslim Sunnites. The same pattern could easily be applicable on a Libya where its tribal hierarchy has been overturned or at least shaken to its foundation.
Besides from the risks of the tribal dimension of the conflict, it is hard to see how the Western powers can topple Gaddafi with air power alone. History has shown that both the British and the German peoples rallied to their leaders during the bombing campaigns of the Luftwaffe and Royal Air Force of World War II. Instead of breaking down enemy moral, the bombings of military and civilian targets stirred emotions and convinced people to increase their contributions to the war effort. Wars can seldom be won with air power alone and it is difficult to imagine how the Libyan opposition can turn the situation around on the ground, especially since the loyalists recaptured vital harbours for oil export. With seemingly boundless financial strength emanating from oil supplies, Gaddafi was able to deploy mercenaries from countries such as Niger and Kenya.
It is hard to foresee the future and I find it peculiar that anyone can claim certainty about the outcome of something as unpredictable as a war. For example, the Americans and Cuban opposition tried to oust the regime of Fidel Castro with similar determination and certainty about success in 1961, but their invasion in the Bay of Pigs turned quickly into a failure. Castro was thereafter able to continue his rule for many decades to come. Gaddafi has been able to rule Libya in equal measure for a considerable time. He is considered to be a murderous lunatic in Western media, but there might be more thoughts pondering in his mind than what his recent actions seem to suggest.
Daniel Nykvist
